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European Institutions
Between Competition and Free Movement. The Economic Constitutional Law
of the European Community. By Julio Baquero Cruz. Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2002. Pp. xxviii, 176. Price $67.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed
by Jeffrey Wu.
One prominent theme of contemporary international politics is the
decline of the nation-state and the emergence of new modes of governance.
The European Union, which restricts the sovereignty of its member states
without itself being a conventional nation-state, is exemplary of the trend.
From a legal perspective, E.U. law is located in the gray area between
international and domestic law. On the one hand, to the extent that national
courts enforce E.U. law, it is comparable to domestic law. On the other hand,
because E.U. law emanates from treaties enacted among sovereign states, it
carries attributes of international law. In recent years, as Europe has marched
steadily toward closer integration, both European courts and academic
commentators have begun to discuss and adjudicate aspects of E.U. law in
constitutional terms. In other words, even in the absence of a formal
constitutional document, which the E.U. is currently busy drafting, parts of
E.U. law may have acquired constitutional status. For American constitutional
lawyers, this idea of treaty-as-constitution seems novel and counter-intuitive.
Isn't a constitution the basic law of a sovereign state? How does
constitutionalism operate without a corresponding state?
Cruz's Between Competition and Free Movement provides a fascinating
and informative account of the economic constitutional law of the European
Community (one of the three "pillars" comprising the European Union along
with foreign policy and internal security pillars). By economic constitutional
law, the author simply means to constitutional provisions and doctrines that
govern economic behavior. In Europe, that means the market governance
regime of the European Community (E.C.). First created as a customs union in
the Treaty of Rome, the E.C. has been expanded to encompass a common
market as well as social and environmental administration. Cruz argues
persuasively that the E.C. Treaty (consisting of the Treaty of Rome of 1957,
plus the revisions promulgated by the Single European Act of 1986, the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, and the Nice
Treaty of 2001) today constitutes a living, operating constitution comparable
to the constitution of a nation-state. Even if provisions of the Treaty were not
designed to form a single, unified constitutional document, these scattered
"constitutional materials" can be interpreted and applied as a coherent
constitution. It follows that problems in E.C. law should be solved through the
methods of constitutional analysis.
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Cruz defines a constitution as an operating body of norms that enjoys
popular acquiescence, establishes governing organs, protects private
autonomy, provides for democratic participation, and wields supremacy over
other legal norms. While the E.C. Treaty clearly satisfies all these criteria,
supremacy is probably the most important contributor to its constitutional
character. The Treaty is supreme over the laws of the member states and has
consistently been applied by national courts to strike down conflicting
national legislation; the reverse does not hold. The Treaty therefore functions
as a higher law against which national law may be reviewed, in a manner
analogous to the U.S. Constitution. But the E.C.'s economic constitutional law
is also distinguishable from its American counterpart for its direct effect on
member states and private actors. Most national constitutions confer the
power of economic regulation on national authorities but do not include
substantive economic rules with direct effect and applicability. For example,
the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with broad powers to regulate
interstate commerce but imposes few requirements on the actual content of
economic regulation. American antitrust law, therefore, remains statutory
rather than constitutional. The E.C. Treaty, in contrast, incorporates economic
regulations that are applied directly by the courts. Competition law in the E.C.
is a constitutional rather than a statutory matter. Although Cruz does not dwell
on this point, the directness of E.C. economic constitutional law is probably
the result of the institution's underlying political structure. In a conventional
nation-state, it is sufficient to confer general economic regulatory power to the
national government. In the E.C., however, by design there is no analogous
national legislature upon whom to confer broad discretionary authority in the
style of the U.S. Congress' commerce power. To create higher law without a
corresponding nation-state, European states have chosen to constitutionalize
substantive economic rules directly. Indeed, it is telling that Cruz confines his
analysis to economic law, because the European Union is still largely an
economic entity, and the law governing its foreign policy and security pillars
remains relatively under-developed. Direct effect may well be a necessary
consequence of a stateless constitution.
Substantively, the E.C.'s economic constitutional law centers on the
twin principles of free movement and competition. Both aim at the creation of
a coherent and unified common market across the borders of member states.
The principle of free movement prohibits member states from imposing trade
barriers or otherwise impeding interstate trade while competition law targets
private actors who obstruct the integration of the common market. As it
stands, however, the law fails to address two critical gaps: restrictions on free
movement perpetrated by private actors and anti-competitive economic action
initiated by states. For instance, an advertising campaign against foreign
products organized by a private consumer's organization would certainly
impede the integration of European markets but would not be actionable under
either the free movement or the competition provisions of the Treaty. The law
of free movement would preclude a member state from engaging in such
advertising, but it would not apply to private organizations. Competition law
also does not apply because of exemptions provided for unions and consumer
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organizations. A further problem is that since both free movement and
competition laws target restraints of trade, either could theoretically be
expanded to address gaps in the law. A coherent analytic methodology is
necessary to delineate free movement and competition in a systematic manner.
To address the problem of gaps and to develop a systematic approach to
the relation between competition and free movement, Cruz draws on
interpretive methods particular to constitutional analysis. Such methods will
be familiar to American readers. First, on the issue of state-sponsored, anti-
competitive behavior, he applies a structural and procedural mode of analysis
reminiscent of McCullouch v. Maryland and United States v. Carolene
Products. Anti-competitive state action should be first scrutinized for
violations of free movement laws, and, in the absence of such transgressions,
it should enjoy a strong presumption of validity under competition laws. The
reasoning is that since competition law is concerned largely with pure issues
of economic efficiency, state competition policy deserves a presumption of
validity because all groups with an interest in efficiency, including producers
and consumers, are represented in the domestic political process. In contrast,
because free movement law protects the interests of foreign nationals
excluded from participation in the national political process, any state action
in violation thereof must be disallowed. The law provides protection where
the political process does not. Cruz's approach here departs significantly from
the European Court of Justice's competition case law, which focuses on
economic efficiency and avoids structural analysis. Second, on the issue of
protectionist private action, attention must be paid to the conflicting demands
of market integration and individual autonomy. While the European Court of
Justice has steadily extended the reach of free movement law into the private
sphere, Cruz cautions that E.C. law should not grow to the detriment of
individual autonomy, itself a compelling constitutional value of the
Community. He counsels that free movement law should apply only where
private individuals have acted with protectionist intent or effect, not
otherwise.
Cruz has made a convincing case that E.C. law both enjoys
constitutional status and should be interpreted and applied using methods of
constitutional analysis. Moreover, his application of structural analysis,
closely informed by knowledge of American practices, is quite sensible.
However, it would have been helpful to include a more explicit and systematic
exposition of the distinguishing features of constitutional analysis, and how it
differs from statutory or treaty interpretation. While the structural method that
the author favors does seem intuitively suited for constitutional analysis, the
reader is entitled to ask what the alternative methods are and why the
structural mode is preferred over them. Although Cruz makes passing
references to textual and prudential modalities of interpretation, he does not
explicitly justify his preference for structural analysis over these alternatives.
Another limitation of the work is its overly technical style. Numerous
references are made to Treaty articles or cases with only bare bones
descriptions of the content of the cited material provided, making the
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arguments relatively inaccessible to readers who are not specialists in E.U.
law.
In spite of its limitations, Between Competition and Free Movement is a
thoughtful work that should be of interest not only to comparative law
scholars but to all those interested in issues at the intersection of
constitutionalism and federalism. At a time when federalism is again a
pressing and contentious issue in American constitutional law, the continuing
evolution of and interplay between supranational law and nation-states in the
European Union may well provide valuable lessons for American lawyers.
Historically, American federalism jurisprudence has swung from a conception
of limited federal power to acceptance of the plenary power doctrine, to what
is today-an uneasy middle ground that seeks to preserve the sovereign
prerogatives of both federal and state governments. While E.U. law is still in a
relatively unsettled and evolutionary stage, it may provide a possible model of
how state sovereignty can be limited, yet at the same time sustained, by
constitutional law.
European Law in the Past and Future: Unity and Diversity over Two
Millennia. By R.C. van Caenegem. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 2002. Pp. viii, 175. Price: $22.00 (Soft cover).
Reviewed by John Coyle.
Europe is changing. At the local level, recent political reforms in such
countries as Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands have for the first
time in almost a century enhanced the political power of regional governments
at the expense of their national counterparts. At a continental level, the power
of European-wide institutions like the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, and the European Court of Justice has steadily increased. While
it is clearly premature to lament the demise of the nation-state in Europe, it is
hardly an exaggeration to say that Europe's recent experiments with multiple
levels of governance have been some of the most innovative and far-reaching
of any region in the world.
In the legal arena, equally significant changes are afoot. One recent
study found that some 80% of the economic and social legislation passed by
the various parliaments of the E.U. member states in 1999 was passed in
direct response to regulations and directives issued by the European Union.
The ongoing deliberations of the European Convention, scheduled to complete
its task sometime in 2003, present the possibility of a still more revolutionary
change. Self-consciously styled after the American Constitutional Convention
of 1787, this gathering of academics, politicians, and citizens' groups from all
over Europe aims to produce a document that would rationalize the structure
and clearly define the institutional competences of a future European Union
consisting of as many thirty member states. This new document is unlikely to
radically expand the powers of the E.U.-it already has jurisdiction over
European competition policy, monetary policy, and commerce between its
member states, among other areas-but its ratification would serve as a
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powerful symbol of the legal unity that the European Court of Justice has
worked to create over the past forty-six years. Today, the holdings of the
European Court of Justice are binding upon the supreme courts of every
member state and courts from across Europe routinely request decisions from
it on matters touching upon European Union law.
With the prospect of these changes at hand, R.C. van Caenegem's
European Law in the Past and Future: Unity and Diversity over Two
Millennia has arrived at a felicitous historical moment. Van Caenegem, a
professor emeritus in the faculty of law and the faculty of letters at the
University of Ghent, has adapted a series of six lectures given (appropriately)
at the University of Maastricht into a collection of brief, accessible essays. As
van Caenegem himself notes, European Law in the Past and Future does not
attempt a general survey of European law. Rather, he spins out vignettes that
touch on the interrelationships among a variety of topics without delving too
deeply into any one.
Most relevant to the contemporary debate about the legal future of
Europe is van Caenegem's discussion of the ius commune, or "the common,
written laws" that bound Europe together during the middle ages (p. 1). He
identifies two halves of the ius commune: the canon law of the medieval
Church and the neo-Roman law studied at medieval universities. These two
legal systems, he argues, exerted a deep and profound influence over
subsequent European law, both at the national and supranational level, that
resonate to the present day.
Van Caenegem draws instructive parallels between medieval canon law
and attempts by the modem-day European Union to create a set of norms and
laws that are binding continent-wide. Canon law was the first common law of
the whole of western Europe; it was taught, administered, and studied without
regard for linguistic or cultural differences. Indeed, the Church itself was in
many ways Europe's first stab at a centralized European government. Its
finances were handled by Italian bankers who did business across the
continent; the departments of the papal government exercised influence in
every western European country; the assorted Church councils at Pisa,
Constance, Basel, and Florence were made up of representatives from across
Europe who met to discuss, debate, and resolve the issues of the day.
Although the European Union is obviously a very different institution than the
medieval Church, van Caenegem draws insightful parallels between the two
that serve as a welcome reminder that a drive for a common European law did
not begin in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome.
Equally influential as canon law, though in a different way, was the
corpus juris civilis, otherwise known as the Code of Justinian. Codified
between 529 and 535 AD by order of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I, the
corpus juris civilis represented the most comprehensive code of Roman law
and to this day represents a foundational document of modem civil law. The
corpus juris civilis represented to medieval scholars the best of what Roman
civilization had to offer. It was rational, theoretically cohesive, and
remarkably comprehensive. Like canon law, the corpusjuris civilis exercised
its influence across Europe, as state after state borrowed crucial elements from
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this code when drafting its own law. Van Caenegem argues that unlike canon
law, however, the ultimate impact of the corpusjuris civilis was to contribute
to heterogeneity among the nations of Europe, as each county adapted the
code to suit its own particular needs. In his words: "Roman law exerted a
divisive influence . . . because its impact varied greatly from country to
country and subsequently created differences between them" (p. 25). Thus,
van Caenegem contends, while both canon law and Roman law exerted an
influence across Europe, one contributed to centralization of legal authority
while the other contributed to its eventual fragmentation.
Van Caenegem occasionally ventures beyond the ius commune, with
mixed results. He provides a concise and insightful introduction to the
similarities and differences between the English, French, and German legal
systems. The breadth and scope of his bibliography is intimidating, as he cites
sources from Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, England, Austria, and
Switzerland, but by and large he focuses on the legal systems of France,
Germany, and England. American law is not his area of expertise, as
evidenced by his cursory and plodding discussion of the Eighth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution; given the title of his book, it is confusing why van
Caenegem felt compelled to discuss American law at all.
Equally baffling is the extended treatment van Caenegem gives to the
stories of five jurists in the Third Reich. Approximately a quarter of the book
is devoted to a description of their efforts to reconcile the logic of their legal
scholarship with the official ideology of the Nazi regime, with very mixed
results. This entire discussion, to put it gently, belongs in another book.
Van Caenegem writes with a breezy style that is surprisingly engaging
given the fact that he spends a great deal of time on topics that, frankly, do not
generally enthrall: medieval canon law, the French civil code, and potential
strategies for reconciling the civil and the common law, among others. If you
know anything about any of these topics already, then it may be better to steer
clear; van Caenegem's essays generally tend towards the synthesis of existing
materials rather then the presentation of original research. For those interested
in how lessons from European legal history might bear upon the present
debates swirling around a expanded role for the European Union, however,
European Law in the Past and Future offers an opportunity to trace out the
fascinating evolution of European law over the past thousand years.
Accountability in the European Union. By Carol Harlow. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi, 198. Price $74.00 (Hardcover). Review
by Christopher Burrell.
Recently, there has been much discussion of a "democratic deficit" in
the European Union. In her most recent book, Carol Harlow approaches the
subject from the perspective of accountability in E.U. institutions. This task is
particularly formidable given the size and complexity of E.U. governing
institutions and the lack of consensus among scholars and E.U. nations
concerning a definition of "accountability." For the sake of concision and in
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an effort to cover the E.U. comprehensively, Harlow assumes that her reader
has a fundamental understanding of E.U. governing institutions and politics.
After an introductory chapter on the concept of accountably, she immediately
jumps into a critique of the accountability deficit in the E.U. Considering the
absence of background material on E.U. governing institutions, this work is
best suited for students of the E.U. and for those who are familiar with the
field.
Diving immediately into the task at hand, the first chapter discusses the
concept of accountability in the European context. The author argues that the
concept is a "relatively recent arrival" to democratic forms of governance (p.
6). Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty contains no reference to accountability. Its
definition has not yet been clearly delineated, and its meaning varies widely
from government to government in Europe. Nevertheless, the author
demonstrates that accountability and transparency in government are
universally recognized among all E.U. member states as a prerequisite for
responsible and democratic governance. For application in later chapters,
Harlow develops a rich, but highly malleable concept of accountability.
Included are the retrospective concepts of giving account, blame and censure,
and redress. But also, Harlow's definition includes a strong sense of
responsibility of members of government before parliament, some form of
legal liability or responsibility of individual functionaries before the courts,
and general concepts of audit and "new public management." Harlow never
defines precisely what she means by accountability, and this ambiguity is at
times problematic in later chapters as the author critiques E.U. institutions and
develops recommendations for improving accountability in the E.U.
After this initial discussion of accountability, Harlow looks at two of the
major institutions in the E.U., the Council of Ministers and the European
Banking System, and outlines why some "black spots" in accountability have
arisen with respect to these institutions. With respect to the Council, there are
two major problems: (1) the persistence of "old style," closed-door
negotiations in the policy and rule-making process creates an accountability
deficit; and (2) the use of temporary expert Committees allows for ministers to
shift responsibility to those committees who because of their ephemeral nature
feel little political responsibility or pressure. The author suggests that
assigning greater accountability to individual ministers and functionaries in
addition to giving the European Parliament (EP) greater powers of sanction
could help to correct the observed accountability deficit in the Council. As for
the European Banking System, autonomy is seen as the major impediment to
accountability. The author argues that while some degree of autonomy is
required for an effective banking establishment, accountability could be
improved by placing greater emphasis on holding the banking system
responsible to parliament for meeting a variety of financial targets, and not
just evaluating its ability to keep down interest rates and inflation.
In chapter 3, the force of Harlow's argument really begins to emerge.
The author highlights several deficiencies in the European Commission
structure that have given rise to a general lack of accountability. Initially the
Commission was conceived of as a highly autonomous body of elites that
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would facilitate transnational policy goals. Its obligations would be to the
European Community as a whole. However, as the author argues, there does
not exist a transnational citizenry that is sufficiently cohesive to whom the
Commission can be accountable. In the absence of a strong parliamentary
body to check the Commission and because of the Commission's autonomy,
there is a large accountability gap.
Moreover, the nature of the Commission's work has changed
dramatically since its inception. Over the last four decades, there has been a
dramatic expansion of the E.U.'s size and competence, much of which has
been extended to the Commission without a corresponding increase in the
managerial capabilities of the Commission or an adjustment in the hierarchical
accountability of the Commission bureaucracy. This has lead to further
potential for abuse of power. In addition to increasing the structural
capabilities of the Commission to self-police, the author asserts that
developing more parliamentary accountability could improve the overall
functioning of the Commission.
Harlow then examines the "prisoner's dilemma" that exists between the
European Parliament on one hand and the national parliaments on the other. In
order for the overall democratic accountability of the E.U. to increase, the
author contends that the European Parliament, most notably, must become a
body more competent to sanction and oversee the activities of other E.U.
institutions. In order to accomplish this expansion of competency at the EP
level, the national parliaments must often give up some authority to the E.U.
However, through this grant, the national parliaments become less capable of
monitoring the policies of their governments to the E.U. Furthermore, Harlow
argues that national parliament grants to the E.U. do not necessarily result in
increased EP competency. When there is not a direct transfer, an
"accountability gap" can open, and the entire E.U. system can actually find
itself with less accountability. The author's proposed solution is to hold the
E.U. system directly accountable to the national parliaments. In this manner,
the E.U. would derive its legitimacy from those state-level democratic bodies,
and they could then more effectively hold the E.U. and EP accountable, which
in turn could allow for the EP to exercise more rigorous accountability
activities.
The author then examines two system-wide strategies to improve
accountability: (1) implementation of greater audit and "new public
management" strategies in E.U. governing institutions; and (2) development
of a more capable judiciary. With respect to audit and "new public
management," the author proposes three potentially beneficial reforms: (1)
Directors General of policy in the European Commission, in particular, and
functionaries, generally, must be held to a greater level of personal
accountability for results in their specific areas of competence; (2) the
European Court of Audit (ECA) must be allowed a greater capacity to audit
and examine E.U. transactions, and it must be centralized so as to be a more
coherent, purposeful institution; and, finally, (3) the EP must be endowed with
the power to back ECA findings with political sanctions. In these
recommendations, the author continues with her general theme of developing
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greater institutional capacity to hold individuals directly accountable as well
as increasing the EP's competency to hold E.U. institutions accountable.
With respect to judicial institutions, Harlow discusses the need for a
capable judicial body to uphold accountability across the E.U. She does,
however, warn of the inherent potential for increasing the "democratic deficit"
if the European Court of Justice is allowed to act too vigorously, in effect
becoming a super-majoritarian body. Because courts are not alone capable of
ensuring an acceptable level of accountability, it is through increased
parliamentary competence that the author views the E.U. as most effectively
being able to improve democratic accountability. In the end, the author's
policy solutions are strikingly in line with the British conception of
accountability as consisting primarily of responsibility of the government
before parliament.
Harlow concludes by stating that, "we should remain in a state of
'provisional suprastatism' from which it is still possible to step back. A
pluralist, decentralized, confederal solution ... will hasten the evolution of a
union of nations firmly grounded in collaboration and consensus. 'Back to the
Future,' in other words" (p. 192). It is the author's contention that given the
current inability of the EP and national parliaments to properly hold
accountable institutions of the E.U., it is not wise to draft a European
constitution or to further formalize E.U. institutions as supranational bodies,
above the authority of national parliament. Rather, the E.U. must be brought
back down to a level parallel to or even subjugated to national parliaments. It
is then that the system as a whole will be capable of maintaining a necessary
level of democratic accountability and transparency.
If Harlow overstates her conclusion and overemphasizes the importance
of parliaments in correcting the "democratic deficit" in the E.U., that does not
take away from her impressive accomplishment of succinctly bringing to light
and evaluating problems of accountability in the E.U. as an institution. This
work should be immensely useful for students of the E.U. looking for insights
into the institution's "democratic deficit."
United Nations
The United Nations System: Toward International Justice. By Nigel D. White.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Pp. xi, 335. Price: $65.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Celia Whitaker.
As the Bush Administration launched its war on Iraq, each bomb over
Baghdad was like a thumb in the nose of the United Nations Security Council.
Three of the "great power" permanent members-France, Russia, and
China-had used their seats on the U.N.'s collective security body to form an
antiwar platform, but ultimately, their defiance of the world's superpower had
come to naught. Was the concept of collective security an anachronism in an
age when the U.S. defense budget alone outstripped the combined military
spending of the next several largest countries? Was the U.N. system of "one
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state, one vote" doomed to perish if its largest state could ignore the votes of
its opponents?
One cannot help but think of these questions while reading Nigel D.
White's The United Nations System: Toward International Justice. This
methodical, thorough review of the United Nations analyzes the
organization's performance from an institutionalist perspective. White, a
professor of international organizations at the University of Nottingham,
approaches his topic by first dissecting the U.N. system into its subsystems.
At the center of the system are the large, political organs: the General
Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat headed by the Secretary-
General. Arrayed around these bodies are a number of specialized agencies,
such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which operate with varying degrees of
autonomy and separation from the center. Finally, the U.N. umbrella also
covers intergovernmental organizations that are included in the U.N. Charter,
but they have independent legal status. These bodies range from the
International Labor Organization to the World Health Organization, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Within each of these
subsystems, of course, are the primary actors in the international system-the
individual nations that choose to pursue their collective interests through the
United Nations.
This institutional model is useful for understanding the theory behind the
United Nations, but it cannot much help scholars who wish to understand how
well the system actually works in practice. As White explains, the United
Nations exists in a middle ground between the Realist vision of nation-states
pursuing their individual interests, on the one hand, and on the other hand, a
utopian ideal of global governance of the international community. Thus, the
U.N. model as originally conceived was a "curious combination of
centralization (e.g. in collective security, at least on paper) and
decentralization (economic and social matters) through the establishment of
specialized agencies" (p. 11).
According to White, this model was inherently unstable for two reasons.
First, as the world became more interdependent and states' economic, social,
and political policies became increasingly interconnected, matters such as
world health or economic development could no longer be dealt with
separately by satellite agencies operating largely autonomously. And second,
at the center of the system, neither the General Assembly nor the Security
Council can claim legitimacy for its actions. Although the General Assembly
is the most inclusive U.N. body, White contends that it cannot truly represent
the international community so long as membership remains restricted to
states. He believes the exclusion of nonstate actors (such as nongovernmental
organizations) and the U.N.'s unwillingness to pierce the veil of the state (to
assess how well member-states actually represent the interests of their
citizens) impairs the General Assembly's legitimacy. The Security Council
suffers from these same handicaps in addition to its more restricted
membership structure.
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In the wake of the recent U.S. standoff with the United Nations over
Iraq, White's chapter on collective security may for many readers be the most
interesting section of the book. Using the same approach as he takes
throughout the work, White begins his analysis with a basic institutional
overview of the U.N. organs with responsibility for peace and security. Most
readers will be familiar with this analysis, which covers the origins of the
Security Council, the creation of the five permanent members, and the system
of rotating members.
White's critique of the Security Council-particularly of the great-
power veto and how it can paralyze Council action-is similarly unsurprising.
He seems to regret that the Security Council's "enormous" power potential
"went unfulfilled for more than four decades due to the intense ideological
rivalry and arms race between the two superpowers." (p. 141). At the same
time, however, he is ambivalent about whether he would like to see the
Council exercise its full powers. The United Nations was created partly in
reaction against the dysfunctional League of Nations. Perhaps nowhere was
this counter-response more evident than in the Security Council-the selective
membership and great power veto were supposed to streamline decision-
making to make the Council more effective in the face of threats to world
peace or security. Structurally, the Security Council privileges efficiency over
representation.
White unfavorably contrasts these aspects of the Security Council's
structure with the inclusive, "one nation, one vote" General Assembly. The
Security Council's small membership "calls into question whether a [Security
C]ouncil mandate lends legitimacy" to any U.N. security action (p. 143).
Starting from the simplistic assertion that "the greater the international
consensus behind the operation, the greater its legitimacy," White argues that
the Security Council lacks the legitimacy to authorize military actions so long
as its membership remains limited to the five permanent members and a small
number of rotating members (p. 143). Security Council-authorized actions
will be legitimate only to the extent that they have the support of the entire
international community-that is, the General Assembly. "Until there is a
major reform of the council," White concludes, "the legitimacy of military
operations will be increased if they also have the support of the General
Assembly" (p. 143).
This critique raises a central theme in White's analysis. Throughout the
book he laments the increasing centralization of U.N. decision-making and the
continued role of power politics in a system that was originally supposed to
protect sovereign equality. Unfortunately, herein lie the inherent
contradictions of White's approach. He has an admirable belief in the sanctity
of the U.N.'s "values." These values incorporate the organization's
"purposes"-its political goals-and its "principles"-the legal rights and
duties of member states (pp. 12-14). Yet too often he does not acknowledge
that there is sometimes a tradeoff between principle and purpose. Most U.N.
observers, even those who share White's reservations about the Security
Council, would be reluctant to see critical decisions on peace and security
matters bogged down in interminable debate in the General Assembly. The
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Security Council evidently cannot claim to represent the entire international
community, and it may well be time to reconsider the great-power veto. But
broader representation is no panacea.
White is an able scholar who is well versed in his topic. His straight-
forward, precise writing is well-structured, if not terribly dynamic. He also has
an inspiring belief in the U.N.'s power to serve the interests of the
international community. He firmly rejects the Realist school of international
politics with his unwavering belief that an international, consensual body-
even one that lacks its own military power and enforcement powers--can
safeguard nation states' economic and political interests and guarantee
collective security. American readers in particular will benefit from this book,
which provides a more balanced and detailed picture of the United Nations
than typically presented by American politicians or the press. Although White
glosses over some of the contradictions of his analysis, it nevertheless raises
important questions about the future of the United Nations in an academic
context as we watch them unfold in a decidedly more political one. The events
of the past year may have already moved the United Nations into a new era,
but White's analysis still remains cogent. He reminds us why the United
Nations matters, and his call for closer adherence to U.N. values and
principles helps expand the political debate over the organization's relevance
in the twenty-first century. After reading White's book, one cannot help but
feel that the story of the United Nations has only just begun.
History, Memory, Reparation
Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of
World War II. By Stuart Eizenstat. New York: Public Affairs, 2003. Pp.
xi, 385. Price: $30.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Patrick Keefe.
Who knew that books by diplomats could be so much fun? If effective
diplomacy necessitates a sort of tyranny of reason-whereby the diplomat
subordinates raw emotion and personal predispositions to the dictates of his
station-then one would think that the studied and sober recollections of
diplomatic negotiations would make for reading not so much dry as arid.
Yet like To End a War, Richard Holbrooke's page-turner account of his
-role in brokering the Dayton Accords, a new book by another prominent
Clinton appointee, Stuart Eizenstat, confounds these expectations. Eizenstat's
Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of
World War 11, unfolds at the tense intersection of politics, diplomacy, and law.
Yet underlying the endeavors he describes is an event which seems more than
any other to frustrate the untainted rationality on which diplomats and lawyers
rely: the Holocaust. The result is a fascinating and informative work for
scholars and practitioners alike; one that manages to be by turns gripping and
vexing, stimulating, and often improbably funny.
Eizenstat served in the Clinton White House as Ambassador to the
European Union and Under Secretary of Commerce and State, and, in 1995,
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became chief organizer and negotiator of a series of claims for restitution
related to the Holocaust. Imperfect Justice chronicles this process, starting
with a call from Holbrooke asking Eizenstat to be special envoy for property
restitution and culminating in a dramatic settlement between several Swiss
banks and Holocaust survivors and the families of victims for more than a
billion dollars. But in between it becomes evident that there is no end to the
unfinished business of the Holocaust, and the focus of Eizenstat's book seems
to metastasize as did the scope of his assignment, from audits of dormant
Swiss bank accounts to looted assets and slave labor, to the wartime Swiss
practice of accepting gold from the Nazis which had in large part been taken
from Jews. Further chapters on the issue of stolen art, the complicity and
profiteering of major corporations, and the settling of scores in France and
Austria, while they may clutter the narrative of the book, are a testament to the
myriad unresolved injustices of the war.
Indeed, it would appear from Eizenstat's account that Nuremberg, while
widely perceived as a landmark in the development of international criminal
justice and the prosecution of war crimes, was merely the beginning.
Imperfect Justice radically complicates notions of neutrality in wartime.
Eizenstat is not simple-minded in his treatment of the Swiss and entertains the
question of whether Switzerland may have been "forced to do business with
the Nazis in order to survive the war as an independent democratic state?" (p.
102). But ultimately, the account is a serious indictment of Swiss conduct.
And Eizenstat concludes: "As the tide of war turned sharply against Germany,
with each month the element of greed grew larger and fear grew smaller
among the Swiss elite, until sheer greed trumped legitimate fear. Switzerland
alone among the neutrals continued its trade with the Germans almost to the
bitter end" (p. 105).
More condemning, perhaps is a remark made by Karl Clodius, the Third
Reich's minister of economics, in 1943, that Germany could "not continue
even for two months without carrying out foreign exchange transactions in
Switzerland" (p. 104). Indeed, one of the recurring diplomatic challenges
recounted in the book is Eizenstat's effort to persuade the Swiss to arrive at a
full accounting-both financial and historical-of their nation's conduct
during the war, despite the fact that doing so would besmirch their cherished
and zealously defended reputation for remaining neutral and above the fray.
The tension between truth and justice that attends the legal process in
general and the treatment of historical crimes in particular is a leitmotif in
Eizenstat's account. Indeed, some of the debate surrounding the relative
merits of tribunals or truth commissions in the wake of historical crimes maps
onto this issue of restitution as well. And here the conflict between diplomacy
and law is most pronounced. On the one hand, the reader is instinctively
sympathetic with the outrage of the survivors and their advocates and can
appreciate at least the symbolic appeal of radical gestures, like calling for
economic sanctions against the Swiss. Yet surely it was Eizenstat's buttoned-
down civility and pragmatic refusal to alarm or offend the parties involved
that allowed such an improbable series of settlements to see the light of day.
And one can only admire the diplomat's stiff upper lip in the face of so
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divisive a series of events. After all, as one of the parties involved, Robert
O'Brien, managing director of Credit Suisse First Boston, found, "logic was
not going to work in dealing with this issue. It was just too emotionally
charged" (p. 158).
In fact, at least in his own telling, Eizenstat often comes across as the
only sane and sober adult in the room. While he is conscientious and self-
effacing in describing his own occasional blunders, he can be coruscating, and
often very humorous, when he describes the other players in the process. "I
felt like the manager of an insane asylum," he remarks at one point. "If the
inmates had not actually taken over, they certainly had been let out of their
rooms" (p. 153). At another point he quips that communicating with the
various parties was "like talking to toddlers" (p. 133).
And what a rogues gallery of characters it is. Much of the momentum
behind the Clinton Administration's involvement came from the efforts of
billionaire and Clinton friend Edgar Bronfman, head of the World Jewish
Congress (WJC), and his guru and aide Israel Singer. These two are joined by
Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, who oversaw
the audit of dormant Swiss bank accounts-the most extensive and expensive
audit in history; Edward Fagan, an opportunistic lawyer who smelled a big
settlement and initiated a series of class-action suits, constantly holding press
conferences, and "shamelessly using elderly Holocaust survivors as props";
Edward Korman, the shrewd and incisive judge who heard the case of the
Swiss banks in Federal Court in Brooklyn; and New York Senator Alfonse
D'Amato, who darted into the spotlight as a settlement approached, sensing an
opportunity to endear himself to Jewish constituents and salvage a doomed
bid for re-election (p. 77).
And these colorful characters hardly exhaust the list of major players, to
say nothing of the supporting cast. Indeed, one of the dispiriting aspects of the
account is the extent to which a wide variety of parties seemed shamelessly
willing to exploit the lucrative possibilities of a huge and high-profile
settlement. Eizenstat reserves a special, unconcealed contempt for this kind of
carpet-bagging desecration of the process and the historical crimes it sought to
redress. "The lawyers hijacked the Swiss bank dispute," he snaps (p. 75).
At the same time, it is hardly surprising that they did so. After all, the
bottom line throughout the book is money-a crude and imperfect basis for
restitution, certainly, but one which is measurable and material.
On the one hand, the Swiss banks, who had made great profits from tainted transactions
with the Nazis, tried to create the impression that money was secondary to maintaining
their national honor and restoring the credibility of their vaunted banks. The class-action
lawyers and the (World Jewish Restitution Organization), on the other hand, liked to talk
about justice to Holocaust victims. But ultimately, both sides had to express themselves
in terms of dollar amounts (p. 137).
Thus, while Eizenstat insists from the beginning that the book "is not really
about money," but rather, "is about the ethical value and weight of memory,"
(p. xi), much of the book is devoted to protracted negotiations over whether
the figure of the settlement would start "with a B" (p. 118).
Recent Publications
There are moments in which this tendency to quantify dispossession and
suffering flirts with the absurd, even the grotesque. Dormant bank accounts in
which there are actual amounts of money that can be calculated and adjusted
for interest are one thing, but payments for forced labor done more than half a
century ago are quite another. While Eizenstat has been rightly applauded for
his indefatigable efforts to orchestrate the three-ring circus that the
negotiations became, and to force it to fashion some crude approximation of
justice, the very crudeness of the justice obtained suggests that a true and
complete restitution is impossible. More was taken than can ever be given
back.
Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair. By Martha Minow.
Commentaries edited by Nancy L. Rosenblum. Princeton: Princeton
University Press (2002). Pp. 302. Price: $16.95 (Soft cover). Reviewed
by Steven Wu.
Historic injustice leaves memories; these memories can, in turn, cause
later injustices. The attempt to break such vicious cycles is the subject of
Martha Minow's Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair, a
collection of essays by Minow and other leading scholars dealing with
historical memories and the violence from which they form and to which they
lead.
The centerpiece of the book is a collection of Minow's three Gilbane
Fund Lectures at Brown University. One theme underlying these lectures is
Minow's recognition of the role that memory plays in current politics. More
important, however, is Minow's insistence that such memory can be shaped
by society's institutions and by the narratives that the law and other official
action create. "[R]ecollections are not retrieved, like intact computer files, but
instead are always constructed . . . Thus, the histories we tell and the
institutions we make create the narratives and enact the expectations, needs,
and beliefs of a time" (p. 28). Of particular importance for Minow is the way
that memory can perpetuate cycles of violence, as past victims, suffering from
remembered indignities, lash out against actual or perceived aggressors,
thereby creating new victims who will harbor similarly explosive resentments.
In the first lecture, Minow surveys various national responses to mass
violence and lays out their respective advantages and disadvantages. Minow
presents a cogent picture of the awesome complexity facing any attempt to
deal collectively with past injustice: every legal approach, however well
intentioned, contains pitfalls that could send the nation into yet another cycle
of violence. Unfortunately, the solutions that Minow sketches are more
suggestions than answers. Perhaps the greatest weakness of her first lecture-
a weakness shared by the volume as a whole-is that a strong argument for
the difficulties of coping with injustice finds no similarly powerful argument
resolving those difficulties. Nevertheless, Minow's first lecture lays out a
persuasive outline of the problems faced by nations responding to historic
mass violence.
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Minow's other two lectures are less compelling. In the second lecture,
Minow proposes regulating hate speech and hate crimes in ways that
acknowledge the historic mistreatment of certain groups without perpetuating
the divisions that initially led to such mistreatment. The article is successful
on its own merits; however, it focuses on the United States and contains only
token mentions of historical memory, making it seem out of place in the
context established by the first lecture. In the third lecture, Minow compares
domestic violence with intergroup violence, finding that legal responses to
both share many of the same pitfalls and promises. While the comparison is
interesting, Minow never makes it clear what the comparison is meant to
illuminate. At certain points she implies that some deep principle underlies
both types of violence, while at other points she implies that examining one
type of violence merely serves as a methodological lens through which to
view the other type of violence. This ambiguity frustrates attempts to discern
the significance of Minow's surprising comparison.
The other essays in this volume fall into several categories: some
provide broad overviews, some apply one of Minow's themes to different
historical periods, and some seem to be only loosely inspired by something
Minow mentions. The overview essays, by Nancy Rosenblum and Marc
Galanter, are the least successful. Rosenblum's essay-which surveys mass
violence, hate crimes, and domestic violence-elaborates little on Minow's
three lectures; it is more a parallel than a follow-up to Minow. Galanter
promises to construct a "matrix" for analyzing questions of old wrongs. Like
Minow, he does indeed present an exhaustive list of the complexities
underlying any attempt to redress past injustice, but his essay similarly
contains more questions than answers.
The essays applying Minow's themes to specific historical periods vary
widely in quality. The best essay of this group is Fredrick C. Harris's
examination of the role of collective memory in the Civil Rights Movements
of the 1960s. Harris argues that memories of past oppression exert two
contradictory impulses on collective action: such memories can frighten
present generations into submission, or it can enrage them to defiance. To
show these opposing pulls at work, Harris traces the effect of four historical
events on civil rights activism in the 1960s. Harris's article is valuable for
revealing the complex and paradoxical ways in which historical memory
shapes current action; it also provides an excellent example of the
methodology behind tracing causal links from past to present.
The most unusual essay in this volume is one that seems only loosely
inspired by Minow's work: an essay by Austin Sarat analyzing the
relationship between memory and vengeance in Clint Eastwood's Academy
Award-winning movie Unforgiven. Sarat's essay hews so closely to the movie
that it reads more like film criticism than political theory, making his insights
difficult to relate to the rest of the essays.
Ayelet Shachar's essay is more successful. Shachar's essay provides an
excellent introduction to personal law regimes: sub-systems of law within a
nation that apply only to certain groups into which individuals are assigned at
birth. Shachar provocatively compares personal law regimes to the western
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system of assigning citizenship at birth, arguing that the arguments most often
made against personal law regimes have the same force when applied to birth
citizenship.
The problem with Shachar's essay, as with the other loosely inspired
works in this volume, is that it has very little to do with the themes laid out by
Minow in her first three lectures. Shachar connects her essay to Minow by
claiming that she is elaborating on the mechanism of group formation that
underlies intergroup violence. However, she fails to connect her otherwise
cogent analysis to attempts at dealing with the present effects of historical
memory.
Shachar's loose connection to the rest of the book is emblematic of a
deeper problem with this collection: although all the essays ostensibly deal
with the same topic, their differences exceed their similarities. Few common
threads tie these essays together except for certain over-broad descriptions:
namely, "memory, law, and repair." One finishes the book with an
appreciation for certain discrete arguments, but no sense of a larger picture.
This disconnection is partly due to the structure of the book. Minow's
three lectures were only loosely connected to begin with, since they touched
on three quite different subjects: mass violence, hate speech and crimes, and
domestic violence. Essays responding to these lectures thus naturally tended
to spiral off in different directions.
But this disconnection is also due to the inherent complexity of the
underlying subject matter. Evaluating historical memories and the cycles of
violence they engender requires coming to terms with an enormous number of
variables, from the broadest level of national history and culture to the
narrowest level of individual psychology. And every instantiation of these
variables involves a different approach, a different methodology, and a
different policy: after all, a national solution to the atrocities in Bosnia may
not be translatable to the genocide in Rwanda, nor to the narrower trauma of
childhood sexual abuse. Breaking the Cycles of Hatred promises to provide a
framework to analyze all of these situations. At that mission, it is less than
successful. But by emphasizing the need to deal with history, even accepting
the near impossibility of a common approach, this book makes a real and
important contribution to our understanding.
Ethnic and National Conflict
Ethnic Conflict & Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. By Ashutosh
Varshney. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. Pp. 400. Price:
$45.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Elora Mukherjee.
In Ethnic Conflict & Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, Ashutosh
Varshney presents a convincing account of why religious conflict afflicts
some areas of India, while other areas with similar demographic
characteristics remain peaceful. Moving beyond conventional political science
theories, Varshney develops a new theoretical approach that explains how
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civil society's intergroup associations can constrain ethnic polarization and
violence. Six city-based case studies, using rigorous methodology, support the
theory in the context of twentieth century Indian politics. This book review
examines how the proposed theoretical approach departs from existing
traditions of inquiry, reviews the case studies offered in support of the thesis,
and analyzes how civil societies can be built to constrain ethnic conflict.
To begin, Varshney systematically connects civil society and ethnic
conflict, which marks an innovation in political science theory. The
connection explains the puzzle left unanswered by existing inquiries, namely
essentialism, instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism. The
traditional explanations analyze macro-level phenomena, such as inherent
group characteristics, political institutions, and nation building. The theories
neither anticipate sub-national variations in ethnic peace, nor explain why
ethnic violence is unevenly distributed across a country. Yet, in India, the
United States, Northern Ireland and elsewhere, ethnic violence tends to be
very locally and regionally concentrated.
Varshney proposes civil society as the explanatory variable that accounts
for why pockets of ethnic violence exist amidst large stretches of peace.
Within civil society, intercommunal networks-not intracommunal
relations-bring different communities together. The intercommunal networks
have two components: first, the associational forms of civic engagement,
which include business associations, professional organizations, reading clubs,
film clubs, sports clubs, festival organizations, trade unions, and cadre-based
political parties that bring Hindus and Muslims together. Second, the everyday
forms of civic engagement, which include instances when Hindu and Muslim
families visit each other, eat together, participate in festivals, and allow their
children to play together. The dual forms of engagement promote robust
interethnic engagement; their absence leaves space for communal violence. In
small villages, Varshney suggests that the everyday forms are the foundation
of civil society. By contrast, in large urban settings, the associational forms
are stronger forces for holding interethnic communities together. Indeed, as
Varshney shows, these connections provide bulwarks against political
attempts to polarize ethnic communities.
Thoroughly researched case studies of India's city-specific Hindu-
Muslim violence illustrate Varshney's innovative connection between ethnic
conflict and civil society. Chapters 3 and 4 lay the foundation for the case
studies by summarizing national trends in political discourse and Hindu-
Muslim violence. These rich narratives of India's religious, ethnic, and caste
diversity offer insight into twentieth century Indian politics. Following this
solid foundation, the analysis launches into case studies in Chapters 5 through
11.
The case studies focus on six cities, three of which are riot-prone and
three of which are peaceful. The cities are arranged into three pairs to compare
each riot-prone city with a peaceful city, holding demographic characteristics
constant. The progression of the pairs adds variable controls: The first pair,
Aligarh and Calicut, controls for Hindu-Muslim percentages in the city
populations. The second pair, Hydrabad and Lucknow, adds controls for past
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Muslim rule and reasonable cultural similarities. In the third pair, Ahmedabad
and Surat share a common history, language, culture, and location within the
state of Gujarat. The case studies draw on extensive research, including
archival research for periods not yet documented by historians; documentary
research for contemporary issues; interviews with the elite in all six cities;
stratified survey research for the cross-section, including the illiterate poor, in
each city; and the Times of India newspaper accounts from 1950 through
1995. The results of the case studies are summarized below.
In the first pair, Aligarh's civil life, as epitomized by its highly
segregated educational system, has been primarily intracommunal, not
intercommunal. This intracommunal civic life leaves few checks against
politicians who promote polarizing strategies, and violence often breaks out
between Muslims and Hindus. By contrast, Calicut has strong intercommunal
links. Although the city had the potential for interethnic violence, the mass
political focus on social justice has pitted lower caste Hindus against upper
caste Hindus, thereby creating strong alliances between the lower caste
Hindus and the Muslims. These interethnic ties have constrained ethnic
violence.
In the second pair, the differences between the civil society structures in
Lucknow and Hydrabad gave rise to relative peace in the former city, and full-
scale rioting in the latter. Notable civil society structures in Lucknow have
included peace committees that bring Hindu and Muslim leaders together,
grassroots organizing efforts that seek bottom-up peace, and alliances between
Muslim workers and Hindu traders that constitute the bedrock of the local
economy. These strong interethnic links contrast with the weak civil society
links in Hydrabad, where economic, social, and civil institutions do not
depend on interethnic ties. The lack of interethnic ties has led to gruesome
violence in Hydrabad, where political parties, factions, and leaders promote
communal violence as a political tool.
The third pair of cities, Ahmedabad and Surat, further illustrates the
lessons drawn from the first two pairs, and does so with added nuance and
complexity. The Ahmedabad riots of 1969 marked the bloodiest and deadliest
Hindu-Muslim violence following the partition. Hundreds of violent deaths in
this hometown of Mahatma Gandhi resulted because the city's mass
organizations no longer fostered Hindu-Muslim unity, and integrated
associations and organizations were declining in membership. In contrast,
Surat, sharing many of Ahmedabad's characteristics, retained its associational
forms of civic engagement, most notably through its heavily integrated
business associations. In 1969, Surat's mayor, confident of the strength of
integration, allowed a Hindu religious processional to take place. The event,
which brought hundreds of Hindus together, proceeded peacefully; by
contrast, similar religious gatherings did not occur in Ahmedabad because of
impending violence.
Together, the case studies prove that a key determinant of peace is
intercommunal civic life, not civic life per se. As Varshney suggests,
understanding civil society offers hope for building intercommunal civic
engagement. This engagement can be fostered through small integrative
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efforts, and the state itself can play a contributing role. Increasing engagement
will help to constrain riots and the loss of human life in India and elsewhere.
Although the media often focuses attention on the destructive power of
ethnicity, life continues peacefully and routinely in many regions where
interethnic links are strong. Ethnic peace and conflict deserve further analysis,
and civil society may offer constructive tools for promoting interethnic
stability. Varshney's powerful analysis marks a first step in a field with
promising developments.
The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? By
Matthew Evangelista. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2002. Pp. xi, 244. Price $49.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Anand M.
Kandaswamy.
It is often forgotten that while the United States enjoyed relative peace
and prosperity in the 1990s, such was not the case for other nations. From
Rwanda to the former Yugoslavia, the last decade of the Twentieth Century
proved that the end of the Cold War had not ushered in the "end of history."
None of these conflicts, however, threatened to have as wide-ranging
implications as the two Chechen Wars that Russia fought, one that began in
1994 and another that commenced in 1999, and both of which contributed to a
civilian death toll that rose into the tens of thousands. Professor Matthew
Evangelista of Cornell University analyzes these wars and their causes and
consequences in his book, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the
Soviet Union? Evangelista's thesis is that Russian Presidents Boris Yeltsin
and Vladimir Putin were wrong to act as if the secession of the rebellious
Chechen Republic would trigger the loss of the other states that comprised
Russia. In fact, Evangelista goes further to bluntly state that Yeltsin and Putin
were the parties most responsible for the Chechen tragedy. Unfortunately, his
treatment of this highly important topic is somewhat flawed because the book
cleaves in several directions and at times seems more interested in addressing
subsidiary issues which have little to do with the central thesis.
A substantial part of the book is devoted to the causes and prosecution of
the two wars. Although this discussion is enlightening for a reader who knows
little about Russian affairs in the 1990s, experts will probably find it a fairly
standard account (It should be noted here that it is still difficult to get many
facts about the Chechen Wars positively verified. Evangelista, like other
scholars, sometimes has to rely solely on the accounts provided by some of
the political participants in the war, which raises issues of objectivity.).
A brief history of the Chechen Wars is needed to fully appreciate
Evangelista's larger point. Chechnya, a part of Russia's southern border with
the nation of Georgia, had a tumultuous history before the 1990s. The
Chechens were seen as a rebellious people and were subjected to mass
deportations to Siberia and Kazakhstan by tsarist, and later, Soviet
governments. As the Soviet Union began to collapse, however, the Chechens
objected to continued domination by Moscow on grounds not solely based on
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nationalism but on ideologies like anti-communism as well. This last point is
important to Evangelista's thesis because it shows that a latent nationalism
was not the sole cause of the first war. Weakness and corruption at the
center-Moscow-created the appearance of an illegitimate government that
the people should struggle against.
In August 1991, a pro-Soviet coup was staged against the reforms of the
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet-appointed authorities that ran
Chechnya did not speak out against the coup and were discredited when it was
defeated. Into this power vacuum stepped Dzhokhar Dudaev a Russian
General of Chechen descent: Dudaev, who originally did not command
widespread support among his people, organized questionable elections that
resulted in his winning the Chechen presidency and declaring an independent
Chechnya. Yeltsin, at this time locked in a power struggle with Gorbachev,
sent a few thousand troops to reassert control in Chechnya. But the Russian
parliament vetoed Yeltsin's move and had the troops leave the Chechen
capital, Grozny.
Evangelista believes that Yeltsin was largely responsible for the 1994
war (the chapter about the first war is called "Yeltsin's War") and marshals
evidence to support this point. Although Dudaev achieves sovereignty over
his republic's own affairs, he was willing to compromise with the Russian
government and remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Yeltsin, however, was distracted by his own political problems and refused to
even meet with Dudaev, for which Evangelista criticizes him sharply. This
criticism seems justified because many Chechens, including Dudaev, were
willing to make political compromises with the Russians.
Despite widespread skepticism in the Russian military about a war with
Chechnya, the Russian army undertook an invasion. From the beginning, the
war was a no-win situation. The invading Russian troops, in violation of
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, brutalized Chechen
noncombatants. The Chechens, who had serious doubts about Dudaev, rallied
around his banner and began to use terrorist tactics, including the taking of
hostages. The Russian forces managed to assassinate Dudaev (and destroy
most of Grozny in the process). Generally, however, the conflict was a
disaster. Faced with an upcoming presidential election and the war's
unpopularity with the Russian public, Yeltsin agreed to withdraw his troops,
ending the first conflict in 1996.
After the war, Chechnya was so destabilized that it became a haven for
crime and religious fundamentalism. The latter took the form of Wahhabism,
which called for the strict practice of Islam, the faith of most Chechens. The
irony was that Russia, in seeking to stabilize and re-integrate its turbulent
republic, had instead weakened it to the point where the people became
susceptible to forces they ordinarily would not have supported. In 1997,
Chechnya held elections, and Aslan Maskhadov became the new leader.
Although Maskhadov was moderate in comparison to his opponents, the
breakaway state enjoyed little peace. Compounding the problem, the Russian
government refused to consistently support the moderate Chechen leadership.
It becomes clear from Evangelista's narrative that the Russian government
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had agreed to the 1996 ceasefire solely because of public opinion, and that it
was actually always looking for a way to reenter Chechnya and reestablish
Moscow's control.
The pretext for Russia's re-involvement in its rebellious southern
republic was a move by a small force of radical Chechens and their
sympathizers, led by two rivals of Maskhadov, Shamil' Basaev and Khattab,
who led their army into the neighboring Islamic republic of Dagestan as a way
of consummating their plan of creating a joint Chechen-Dagestani nation.
Most Dagestanis were actually opposed to the invasion and fought both the
invading force and the radical form of Islam they espoused. Putin, who had
inherited the reigns of power from Yeltsin, saw this as a means of re-involving
Russian troops in Chechnya (the chapter about the second war is
unsurprisingly called "Putin's War"). Putin, unlike Yeltsin, commanded
popular support for this new Chechen war because of a series of mysterious
bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk that killed hundreds in September
1999. Although the case was never fully solved, the terrorism was attributed
to the Chechens by the Russian government, creating popular support to quell
Chechnya. Evangelista, like many other observers, raises the possibility that
the bombings may have been carried out by Russian forces in order to
manufacture consent for the second Russian incursion. Whatever the truth, the
result was just as tragic as the first war. Although Russia managed to seize
control of most of Chechnya, the cost was terribly high.
Evangelista sees much of what Yeltsin and Putin did as worthy of
condemnation. Both men evidently believed that allowing Chechnya to go its
own way would lead to the dissolution of Russia. Putin is quoted as saying, "If
we don't put an immediate end to this (the Chechen rebellion), Russia will
cease to exist. It was a question of preventing the collapse of the country" (p.
6). In Chapter 5 of the book, after providing his historical account of the
conflicts, Evangelista takes exception with this view. It is here that the author
tries to state his central argument, and it is also here that the book's objective
thesis becomes problematic.
To counter the view held by Putin and Yeltsin, Evangelista studies four
regions among the eighty-nine "subjects" that constitute the Russian
Federation. Each of the four regions shares certain characteristics with
Chechnya, be it religion or a sense of historical persecution. Yet none of them,
nor any of the other subjects, chose to secede from the weakened Russian
Federation in the wake of the first Chechen resistance. Dagestan, Chechnya's
neighboring republic, shares a common history and an Islamic identity with
the Chechens. But the majority of Dagestanis were opposed to a union with
Chechnya because of their long tradition of supporting centralized rule.
Furthermore, Russia provided the desperately poor province with a great deal
of economic aid; such aid was never provided to Chechnya.
Tatarstan was another republic considered to be a prime candidate for
secession. Unlike other subjects, Tatarstan was economically prosperous.
Although the republic contributed much to the Russian budget, it received
little attention from the government. Consequently, the state began to agitate
for greater independence. Instead of resisting militarily, Russia largely
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acquiesced to Tatarstan's demands and signed a treaty that gave Tatarstan
greater autonomy, while still preserving its economic and social ties to Russia.
Bashkortostan, a wealthy state to the east of Tatarstan, was similarly given a
great deal of control over its affairs by Russia. Finally, Evangelista looks at
states in Russia's so-called Far East. Although this region has a long and
distinct history, with many grievances against Moscow, it has never seriously
considered leaving Russia. The few times that it has threatened to do so, a
regional politician was usually behind the threat as a political ploy, which was
later retracted when the politician won office.
On the basis of these four case studies, Evangelista boldly declares that
further secession is unlikely. He chooses his four examples because they share
similarities with Chechnya. What Evangelista succeeds in doing, however, is
convincing the reader that the dissimilarities between Chechnya and the other
subjects outweigh any noticeable similarities. Each of the four regions has its
own idiosyncratic qualities that militated against secession and that sometimes
led Russia to make concessions. For example, the two areas that were given
greater autonomy by the Russians were relatively prosperous and had more
political clout. Unlike Chechnya, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were
economically important. Thus, Russia was probably more worried about
alienating them than a very poor state like Chechnya. Dagestan had a long
history of being ruled by totalitarians, like the Russians, and had probably
accepted this fate. Finally, the Far East regions, for all of their pretensions to
nationality, share much in common with their Russian brethren.
What this seems to demonstrate is that the unique characteristics present
in each subject determined the outcome of whether it seceded or not.
Chechnya, poor and rebellious, made the decision to leave and paid the price
for it. If this is true, then we must ignore attempts, like Evangelista's, to make
'any grand predictions. Depending on how unique each subject is, eighty-nine
case studies might be required.
Another major problem with Evangelista's thesis is that it makes
predictions on the assumption of a static situation. The author never develops
a more rigorous, formal model that would give the reader greater confidence
in his predictions. Evangelista is probably right in noting that economic
accommodation by Russia helps to nip many autonomy movements in the
bud. But it fails to explain whether other states in the North Caucasus would
ever seek separation from the center. Dagestan, Chechnya's neighbor, did not
seek autonomy, Evangelista writes, because it has a long tradition of obeying
a central authority. Given that Dagestan is virtually identical to Chechnya
except for this tradition, it would seem that it is very difficult to conclusively
say that no other state will secede.
The addendum to the Evangelista theory is that Russia faces greater
danger when it seeks to forcibly repress the sporadic autonomy movements
that may spring up. But Evangelista is never able to prove this point
conclusively. Indeed, the book shows how the Russians face little
international backlash for their actions in Chechnya. Both the United States
and Western Europe have been reluctant to criticize Russia, feeling that they
need the cooperation of Putin in other matters of vital interest, like combatting
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terrorism. Evangelista has a long and involved discussion in Chapter 7 of how
the Russians have violated even the minimum guarantees provided by
international treaties. This discussion provides a fascinating view into how the
Russian government and military regard international law. Unfortunately,
however, it does little to advance his central thesis, especially since the West
has been very sporadic in holding Russia accountable to these international
laws.
If there is a problem with The Chechen Wars, it is that it tries too hard to
be a comprehensive treatment of its subject. This weakens the central thesis
and detracts from Evangelista's argument. As a first look at an important
subject, however, The Chechen Wars fulfills its goal. Given the troubled
world we inhabit today, Professor Evangelista's narrative provides a
cautionary tale.
The Law of Internal Armed Conflict. By Lindsay Moir. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xix, 306. Price: $70.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Adil Ahmad Haque.
Those who seek a working knowledge of the international norms
governing intranational hostilities will profit from Professor Moir's overview
of the sources of and problems facing this increasingly important body of law.
Those already familiar with these norms and those immersed in original
research in related areas will not. The Law of Internal Armed Conflict is not
the "comprehensive analysis" promised on the inside front cover. The book
contains few original arguments and fewer original insights. For the most part
it is, like most law books, a book in which one learns what other books
contain. But it is not a criticism of a book that it is an introduction and not a
treatise, or even that it summarizes rather than transforms. The question is one
of audience. Moir's clear exposition makes for fast and easy reading and
leaves the novice with a strong grasp of the relevant sources of law and their
relationship to one another. So it is to the novice that this book is of greatest
value.
The book's structure is straightforward. The first chapter discusses the
old law of belligerent recognition, which brought the laws of war to bear on
internal conflicts to a greater or lesser extent based on classification of a
conflict as one of belligerency, insurgency, or rebellion-a classification of
both discovery and decision. The second chapter discusses Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which replaced the reciprocal obligations
imposed by the doctrine of belligerent recognition with unilateral obligations
regarding non-combatants, surrendering combatants, prisoners, the sick, and
the wounded. The third chapter discusses Additional Protocol II of 1977,
which clarified and expanded upon the principles of Article 3. The fourth
chapter discusses customary international law, which brings the laws of war
and principles of humanity to bear on internal armed conflict. The fifth
chapter discusses the law of human rights, which imposes further obligations
on states.
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Professor Moir's diligent exposition shows how the various sources of
law interact. The doctrine of belligerent recognition may be dead, but states'
fear of granting legal personality to rebels and insurgents remains a powerful
motive for classifying civil strife in such a way as to avoid falling under the
laws of war. Article 3, though conventional in origin, has achieved customary
status through continued use in justification and criticism of the use of force,
and has expanded its reach beyond the parties to the Geneva Conventions.
Customary law supplements conventional law with norms of necessity,
proportionality, and distinction, as well as constraints on means and methods
of combat. Finally, human rights norms, though binding only on states and
partially derogable in times of national emergency, often make concrete the
more abstract demands of humanitarian law. Human rights instruments
dealing with torture and due process rights, for instance, specify in greater
detail the requirements of customary and conventional norms.
The book concludes with a chapter on implementation and enforcement
that gives point and purpose to earlier discussions of criminal responsibility
and the mechanics of various human rights bodies which may have struck the
reader as tedious and rather out of place. Half the chapter is devoted to
enforcement of human rights law through the United Nations and regional
systems. The twenty-three pages left to discuss implementation of
humanitarian law include four pages on individual criminal responsibility and
a bizarre six-page digression on belligerent reprisals. The remainder of the
discussion focuses on the dissemination of humanitarian norms and on diffuse
diplomatic pressure. Framed by Moir's claim that the law of internal armed
conflict needs not reform but obedience, the impotence of existing
mechanisms and the fragility of the new International Criminal Court leaves
the reader more depressed than enlightened.
Few books that canvass sources of law and delve into drafting history
will provide many thrills. Some excitement is offered by a lengthy, albeit
discontinuous, treatment of the rulings by the various chambers of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal in the Tadic case, but here too the analysis is more
exploratory than conclusive.
Overall, Moir's book is a well-written introduction to an important area
of law, but provides neither definitive analysis nor original insight. Students
seeking an overview of the law of internal armed conflict would do well to
consult it.
Recent Developments
Globalizing AIDS. By Cindy Patton. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2002. Pp. xxvii, 156. Price: $18.95 (Soft cover). Reviewed by
Samantha Chaifetz.
"What's in a name?" Shakespeare's Juliet queried. "[T]hat which we call
a rose/By any other name would smell as sweet." We can agree ontologically
but still question the young girl: would we stop to appreciate its pleasant scent
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if it were baptized another appellation? There is clearly prodigious power
vested in a name. More than a sound or a mark on a page, a name is an
emblem of a class, a community created by a label-the culmination of the
power to include or exclude by definition. Through such reasoning, the power
to name, to define, and to narrate becomes the power to construct perceptions
and realities.
In Globalizing AIDS, Cindy Patton's latest contribution to the field of
health and culture studies, she explores the powerful effects of naming a
disease and positing a story of its origins and spread. Continuing the post-
modem critique of the forces and institutions framing the HIV/AIDS
pandemic begun in her earlier works, including her 1990 Inventing AIDS,
Patton analyzes the explanatory and descriptive narratives of AIDS born in an
age of globalization.
Patton argues that today's mainstream understanding of AIDS (as
propagated by the World Health Organization, for example) is founded upon
two "intertwined but... divergent medical thoughtstyles"-tropical thinking
and epidemiology (p. 33). She contends that the collision and ultimate
amalgamation of these flawed attempts at global medical logics-each with its
own underlying perversions (be it racism, colonialism, or classism) and
propensity for oversimplification-has resulted in an internally incoherent
understanding of AIDS and, in turn, produced problematic, even disastrous,
policies.
Globalizing AIDS is carefully written and expressive, drawing on a
combination of taut multi-disciplinary research-reflecting Patton's
background as a scholar and journalist-and a wealth of personal
experience-reflecting her twenty year involvement in AIDS education and
community organizing. Patton's background enables her to offer an intimate
evaluation of the ways in which a globally disseminated disease narrative can
be divorced from local experiences, yet nevertheless impact significantly, via
policy, how individuals experience the disease.
Patton ably addresses overlooked episodes in the history of AIDS. She
begins by recalling the activist response in the United States in the early
1980s, an oft-forgotten time before the disease was named. Elsewhere Patton
has written about the "amnesia surrounding the history of activism between
1981 and 1985." In this text, she pays tribute to the work done during this
period by movingly recounting its history.
Patton's initial focus on the United States in the time "before The
Name" (p. 25) differs from the rest of her text, which sweeps more quickly
and sometimes more broadly over time and locale. Yet, it is an appropriate
starting place as it allows Patton to introduce the major themes of her
analysis-the critical and neo-imperialistic influence of the U.S. on the
globalization of AIDS thinking, the contingency of historical development,
and the essentializing role of narrative. Patton offers the story of the naming
of the disease "to suggest that AIDS is not a fixed thing, a natural
phenomenon that necessarily engenders one response or another" (p. 25);
throughout the text, she highlights how the development of HIV/AIDS has
been premised upon a series of subjective contingencies. While it would be
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easy to assume the inevitability of the pandemic as we know it, Patton
convincingly argues that our understanding of AIDS (beginning with its
name) and its evolution have been the result of the ideas and decisions of
those positioned to conceptualize and to respond to the disease. Hers is a tacit
challenge to the reader to accept the following: to alter the future course of
AIDS (or even to grasp our ability to do so) requires recognition of its
contingent nature. In this vein, Patton explores the complex interactions of
communities of activism, health policymaking, media, and importantly
scientific research (with its key role in defining the disease). She begins to
demonstrate how science is employed as a supposedly neutral source of
credibility to support conceptions of AIDS, while it is arguably itself a social
construct-a field acted upon by extrinsic, social forces.
Patton's moderate version of the social constructivist argument is further
developed as she delves deeply into the "abstract issue of the role of medical
thinking in global AIDS representation and policy" (p. 25). She devotes a
significant portion of the book to a general (non-AIDS-specific) and highly
theorized comparative discussion of tropical thinking and epidemiology, the
two styles of medical thought from which, she holds, we derive our
understandings of and approaches to infectious disease.
Patton describes tropical thinking as an international approach with a
"melodramatic ... sensibility" (p. 37). Born of a colonial history that prizes
borders, this approach conceives of disease spatially, as indigenous to
particular parts of the world. Tropical thinking assumes the first world,
western body as its norm and looks elsewhere for the origins and natural
habitats of disease. Epidemiology, on the other hand, represents a
transnational conception, "divested of the idea of nation" (p. 33), and instead
focuses on pathways of disease transmission over time. While less colorful
than tropical thinking, epidemiology may still be tainted by its norm-the
susceptibilities of the middle-class body.
Despite substantive differences, tropical thinking and epidemiology
present similar problems for the AIDS narrative. Like phrases in a long game
of "telephone," these thoughtstyles pass through the hands of many before
they reach the public at large; there are, multiple opportunities for
misrepresentation by intermediaries (e.g., media sources) seeking to simplify
or failing to fully comprehend the disease. The embedded stereotypes
(concerning, for example, who is or may become diseased) surface quickly
and have the capacity to both mask societal wrongs and to shield people from
vital preventive messages. As Patton concludes, it becomes all too easy to say,
"I don't live/go there" or "I'm not one of those" (p. 120).
The opportunity for evasion and denial is particularly striking since the
thoughtstyles, which vied for ideological position through the 1980s, have
now merged in the telling of the AIDS story. The World Health
Organization's current schematic associates geography with epidemiological
conceptions of "characteristic interactions" (p. 59) to produces patterns of
infection. For example, Pattern Two, known as "African AIDS," refers to
places where transmission is primarily through heterosexual intercourse. This
compounding of concepts affords multiple "outs," allowing many, like
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homosexuals in such regions, to slip through the conceptual cracks. Patton
argues that epidemiological ideas about AIDS, once merely colored by
tropical thinking, are now nearly supplanted by its notions. While the reasons
for this co-opting of the AIDS story are not fully fleshed out, the presence of
"tropical logics ... at [the] core" (p. 64) of current thinking makes it seem
unlikely that we will move past the blame game in the near future-the
fruitless hunt through "deviance" for the origins of AIDS continues.
Patton is arguably at her most precise and well-grounded as she makes
her way through a "tour of places and of policies that both rely on and disrupt
the two thoughtstyles ... that are built into scientific and activist concepts of
the epidemic" (p. 114). It is in these places that she situates her most insightful
commentary on the unfortunate ramifications of these attempts to explain
AIDS and "shed[s] light on why a 'global solution' may be impossible and
why the legacies of colonialism and modernization allow for the spectacular
and insidious recycling of racist, sexist, xenophobic, and homophobic ideas as
though they were 'scientific"' (p. xxvi).
Indeed, by the end of the book the idea of a "global solution" not only
seems impossible, but the search for it troubling. Patton successfully
problematizes our desire for a simplistic, all-encompassing global narrative
given its tendency to alienate and mischaracterize. The subtext of Globalizing
AIDS runs consistently throughout: attempts to secure a singular meaning for
the disease-to boil down myriad experiences into a single name or story-
may serve a sociopolitical purpose but are the source of significant distortion
and harm.
In this respect and in others, Patton embraces the tenets of a postmodern
normative framework-opposition to an international standard, acceptance of
fragmentation and multiplicity, paradigmatic recognition of globalization, and
endorsement of cross-cultural or cross-medium fertilization. The varied
manifestations of AIDS, and its unique status as a medical crisis found in
developed and developing countries alike, make ideal fodder for such an
analysis. Patton seeks to avoid an endless ferreting out of the so-called true
story in favor of more nuanced views of AIDS-views that recognize many
underlying truths by heeding the voices (even those from the periphery of
society) that attest to variable experiences. This objective and Patton's
corresponding critique of the World Health Organization's model rest
comfortably within the literature of globalization and development which is
frequently critical of the neo-imperialistic tendencies of transnational
institutions.
In postmodem fashion, Patton is attentive to the dualities, the
ambiguities and unexpected consequences produced by actions taken in a
globalized society. For example, she contrasts the need to name the disease in
order to engage a societal response with the exclusionary function of naming
and the foreclosures it politically effects. Her detailed assessment of the
prevention and health education policies that result from our conception of
AIDS might be expanded to consider, in similar depth, the impact of the
current AIDS narrative on other policy areas, such as treatment access.
Recent Publications
Patton ultimately articulates the need for cross-cultural understanding
paralleled by strategies built around local communities and supported by
recognition that AIDS exists in diverse realities. Although Patton's guidance
is somewhat nebulous, her dissection of current policy and practice remains
thorough, intellectually impressive, and fundamentally enlightening.
Much of the strength of Globalizing AIDS comes from Patton's fluency
in varied theoretical domains. She is plugged into an array of major ideas,
from sociology and public health to economics and political science; her acute
statements frequently demonstrate this remarkable peripheral vision. While
not all of Patton's argument is constructed around the boldest or most novel of
propositions, she is smart in connecting her ideas to an expansive web of
social science theory. She explores the complexity of interactions between the
institutions she describes and confronts challenging epistemological questions.
She writes for an engaged audience: while the active reader is captivated by
Patton's interlocking concepts, the passive reader might find himself lost in a
sea of ideas.
Faced with evidence of a growing HIV/AIDS pandemic (and the ever-
present potential for new infectious diseases), Patton's theory of socio-
historical contingencies is a source of hope. It reminds us that the continued
spread of HIV/AIDS is likely, but not inevitable. We may still arm ourselves
with nuanced narratives that give real voice to communities.
Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe.
Edited by Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. Cole. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2002. Pp. xvii, 546. Price: $27.50 (Soft
cover). Reviewed by Christina M. Craige.
When Communism lost its grip on Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, new
regimes began their drive for nationalism and legitimacy. The ensuing
political climate welcomed the opportunity for both great advances and also
great regressions in human rights. Protecting the Human Rights of Religious
Minorities in Eastern Europe is a compilation of nineteen essays written by
authors representing eleven countries on topics ranging from "External
Monitoring and the International Protection of Freedom of Religion and
Belief' to the "Catholic-Jewish Dialogue in Poland." The authors explore how
religions, both new and old, contribute to and stand in the way of the unity of
these post-Communist states, and how the adherents of different religions are
protected or burdened by their respective governments. Because of the
authors' varying perspectives and the breadth of topics addressed, the book
provides an enjoyable, insightful, and accessible introduction to the interplay
of human rights and religion in Eastern Europe.
Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe
is divided into the following four sections: theoretical perspectives,
international legal perspectives, case studies, and non-legal perspectives.
David Little's essay, "Religious Minorities and Religious Freedom," which
commences the first section, relates the basic normative framework of "belief-
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related rights" concerning the authors throughout the volume: the right of
religiously or conscientiously-held beliefs and their manifestations; the right
to equality despite religious affiliation; the right of members of religious,
ethnic, or linguistic minorities to practice their beliefs, enjoy their culture, and
speak their language; and the right of individuals to be free from targeting by
advocacy of religious-based hatred. With the fall of communism, the drive for
nationalism in many eastern European countries has utilized traditional
religion as an initial unifying principle. The book proposes the idea that
religious minorities-particularly those whose religion is of relatively recent
introduction to the area-are seen as an obstacle to state unity. As such,
administrative and informal discrimination abounds.
The second section addresses different possible schemes for external
state actors to affect the treatment of religious minorities in other countries. In
his essay on "External Monitoring and the International Protection of Freedom
of Religion or Belief," Peter G. Danchin explores a range of enforcement
options, including those pursued by the religious organizations themselves, by
international human rights organizations (including United Nations-based
organizations and independent NGOs), and by unilateral (or bilateral) and
multilateral treaties. Of particular interest and timeliness is Danchin's
discussion of the immediate and long-term effectiveness of bilateral (or
unilateral) and multilateral monitoring regimes, in addition to other forms of
enforcement. Danchin concludes that for the legitimacy of human rights as a
matter of international concern and focus, unilateral actions taken by countries
without the support of the international theater ultimately undermine a unified
front against oppression and discrimination. Other essays in this section
address the progress made by the European Court of Human Rights and the
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. An essay by Johan van
der Vyver exploring the rights of religious minorities to self-determination
and how such a right may (but by no means must) lead to a right to political
secession is particularly well-written and analyzed. Van der Vyver concludes
that religious minorities have a right to determine the course of their lives and
must be guaranteed sufficient political freedom to do so. However, to
transmute such a right into a guarantee of political autonomy would lead to
unconsidered consequences, such as continued religious repression by the
now-majority toward minorities in the newly-formed state (even within the
same religion!), political and administrative mismanagement, and a general
decline in quality of life.
The third section of the book compares the rights of religious minorities
situated in western European countries. Two case studies explore the situation
in Spain and Belgium, respectively. The essays were well-picked by the
editors, since the level of church-state cooperation is similar in the two
countries and the Catholic Church enjoys a privileged position in both. Of
broader sweep is Carolyn Wah's essay on the two-tiered system of religious
rights granted by the European Parliamentary Enquete Commissions. Wah's
essay addresses how "new" minority religions are mischaracterized and
afforded substantially fewer protections than either majority religions or "old"
minority religions. Examples of new minority religions would be the
Recent Publications
Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Scientology, and the International Society
of Krishna Consciousness, among others. Typical old minority religions
include Islam and Judaism. Wah explores the (mis)characterization of various
new minority religions as "sects" or "cults" and the role of the psychology
profession in fostering negative perceptions of such religions. She cautions
against the "danger that psychiatrists and other mental health professionals
will become arbitrators of what constitutes a healthy, normal, or acceptable
belief," and that "[s]tratification of religious organizations is a dangerous
inroad into the liberties presently identified in European democratic societies
as fundamental freedoms" (p. 382). Such caution is salient for Europe, but
should hold special relevance for the United States as well.
The final section of the book delves into the actions that may be taken
by non-state actors to advance the cause of religious minorities. The main
focus of the essays is (with the exception of Robert Goeckel's discussion of
the Lutheran Church in East Germany), quite understandably, the Catholic
Church. In his essay on "The Catholic Church in Post-Communist Europe,"
Timothy Bymes explains that "the Roman Catholic Church is . . . a highly
centralized transnational institution, capable, in theory at least, of developing
and in some sense enforcing a coherent and consistent policy of defending
human rights and religious freedom across the continent" (p. 455). Adding to
this fact the prominent political position enjoyed by the Catholic Church in
most, if not all, eastern European countries, the Church can and has made real
progress in advancing the cause of religious minorities. As noted by Tad
Stahnke in his essay on "Equality and Religious Preferences," the Catholic
Church's recognition of a right to religious freedom at the Second Vatican
Council in 1965 "is especially significant to schemes of state recognition in
those countries where Catholicism is the dominant religion" (p. 90). Although
the Church has in some respects contributed to the tolerance enjoyed by some
minorities, Wah argues that such contribution seems at times strained, if not
grudging.
The publishing of Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities
in Eastern Europe could not come at a better time. The need for greater
religious tolerance and understanding has only been exacerbated in a post-
September 11 world. The principles explored and adduced by the authors in
this volume are applicable worldwide and across different religions. While the
volume's essays do not always seem to follow an established trajectory, it is
enjoyable and generally well-written. In the Afterword, Donald W. Schriver
specifically addresses Americans and, in so doing, perfectly captures what a
U.S. audience should at minimum bring away from the volume. That is,
Americans must understand the true nature of the historical differences
between Eastern Europe and the United States and the reasons why religion is
bound up with the cause of human rights in the former region. Overall, the
greatest accomplishment of the volume may be that it employs a less volatile
context in which to present the importance of religious equality and
acceptance and thus reminds us of the ramifications we might face if we
neglect such principles.
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